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Saturday, November 5, 2016

Exception To The Rule




A Youth In Apparel That Glittered
Stephen Crane

A youth in apparel that glittered
Went to walk in a grim forest.
There he met an assassin
Attired all in garb of old days;
He, scowling through the thickets,
And dagger poised quivering,
Rushed upon the youth.
"Sir," said this latter,
"I am enchanted, believe me,
To die, thus,
In this medieval fashion,
According to the best legends;
Ah, what joy!"
Then took he the wound, smiling,
And died, content.



Thursday, November 3, 2016

Sorting Ideas

In this forum thread... 4th Grade Nation State... we've primarily been debating/discussing the idea of replacing voting with spending (coasianism).   The thread is up to 27 pages.  Here's a recent post...

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According to Google, the US population, rounded to the nearest million, is 319 million.

Let's say that someone comes up with the idea that humans of a certain race/colour/religion are "less human" than others, and we should be able to own them like property. The overwhelming majority of people would consider this to be a very bad idea. Let's assume that 99.7% of Americans consider the idea of owning another human abhorrent. In raw numbers, this would be approximately 318 million people, with around 1 million people being pro-slavery.

The issue comes up for voting. It's dead in the water. Why? Because the majority of people recognise a disgusting idea when they see it.

The issue comes up for bidding. 318 million people spend an average of $1000 each on the "no" campaign. Some more, some less, depending on circumstances, but it averages to $1000 per person. That's $318 billion. 1 million people spend $320,000 on the "yes" campaign. That's $320 billion. Despite the overwhelming majority finding the idea detestable, slavery is now a thing because a couple of people have deeper pockets than the rest.

"Ah," you say, "but they'll get MONEY!"

Yes, they will. Their civil rights, liberty and personhood was valued at a little over 1 billion dollars. Given that they've lost their personhood and are no longer considered human, would they even receive it? That would depend on how the law that 0.3% of people actually wanted was written.

Now do you understand why coasianism is worse than voting? - Dazchan

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If Dazchan had been following the thread all along then he would have known that the issue of slavery had already been brought up by another member... Galloism.  Alternatively, Dazchan could have figured this out if he had searched the thread for "slavery".

A thread consists of posts and each post is an idea.  By default, the posts/ideas are sorted chronologically... oldest to newest.

But what if the pragmatarian model was applied to the forum?  Each member would have to pay $1/month but they could choose which posts they spend their pennies on.  Then it would be possible to sort threads and their posts by their total value.

Galloism would still have brought up his idea about slavery being an effective argument against coasianism.  But then he, and everybody else, would have had the option to spend their pennies on his post.  The more pennies that were spent on Galloism's post, the higher up it would have been placed on the list of posts/ideas when they were sorted by their value... and the more likely that Dazchan would have seen it.

Here are a couple of basic facts...

1. We all have limited attention/time/brainpower
2. Not all ideas are equally valuable

When we put these basic facts together, it should be clear that maximizing society's benefit depends on sorting ideas by their value.

With this in mind, let's consider Dazchan's concern about slavery and coasianism.   Imagine that Bob posts in my thread, "slavery is wonderful".  It is an idea... but most of us would consider it to be a bad idea.  This means that, with the pragmatarian model, most of us would not be willing to spend our pennies on Bob's idea/post.  As a result, when the posts/ideas in the thread were sorted by their value, Bob's idea would be at the bottom of the list.

Would we use coasianism for such a worthless idea?  I don't think so.  Then again, by this same measure, coasianism and pragmatarianism probably aren't currently much more valuable than the idea of slavery.  Which is why we can't currently sort ideas by their value.  All ideas have to start somewhere...

Our creed is that the science of government is an experimental science, and that, like all other experimental sciences, it is generally in a state of progression. No man is so obstinate an admirer of the old times as to deny that medicine, surgery, botany, chemistry, engineering, navigation, are better understood now than in any former age. We conceive that it is the same with political science. Like those physical sciences which we have mentioned, it has always been working itself clearer and clearer, and depositing impurity after impurity. There was a time when the most powerful of human intellects were deluded by the gibberish of the astrologer and the alchemist; and just so there was a time when the most enlightened and virtuous statesman thought it the first duty of a government to persecute heretics, to found monasteries, to make war on Saracens. But time advances; facts accumulate; doubts arise. Faint glimpses of truth begin to appear, and shine more and more unto the perfect day. The highest intellects, like the tops of mountains, are the first to catch and reflect the dawn. They are bright, while the level below is still in darkness. But soon the light, which at first illuminated only the loftiest eminences, descends on the plain and penetrates to the deepest valley. First come hints, then fragments of systems, then defective systems, then complete and harmonious systems. The sound opinion, held for a time by one bold speculator, becomes the opinion of a small minority, of a strong minority, of a majority of mankind. Thus the great progress goes on, till schoolboys laugh at the jargon which imposed on Bacon, till country rectors condemn the illiberality and intolerance of Sir Thomas More. - Thomas Macaulay

Yesterday morning, like most mornings, I was browsing Medium trying to find valuable ideas.   Of course the ideas aren't sorted by their value.  So it's a very challenging Easter Egg hunt.  But I did manage to find a couple valuable Easter Eggs...


Each of these Easter Eggs is an idea... but each idea also contains several ideas.  Let's consider some of the individual ideas...

You actually put a person in a situation where there’s real money at stake, and all of a sudden they’re not so irrational. - Steven Pinker

This idea is another basic fact.  I've previously referred to this basic fact as Tabarrok's Rule.  Let's add it to the other two facts...

1. We all have limited attention/time/brainpower
2. Not all ideas are equally valuable
3. Spending improves rationality

Maximizing society's benefit depends on sorting ideas by their value... and determining an idea's value depends on spending.

Is this relevant to language?

That is Hayekian in the sense that no one planned the language to be optimal in satisfying one criterion. There are tradeoffs. There are multiple tugs, pushes, and pulls. As millions of speakers make little adjustments, as they use the language, as kids learn the language, the language itself spontaneously evolves with some balance. - Steven Pinker

The other day I mentioned to my friend Michelle that there's "real", "unreal" and "surreal" but no prefix for better than real.  For over an hour she argued that A. there was no such concept and B. there were already words to express such a concept... ie "fantasy"... "utopia".   I brought up the same topic a day or two later and she came up with "megareal".  "Megareal"?  I didn't think that it was a wonderful word... but, for lack of a better word, we've ended up using it.  It is a useful word!  When I say that it would be megareal if we could choose where our taxes go, she knows exactly what I'm talking about.

Michelle teaches 4th grade and she recently started applying coasianism and pragmatarianism to her classroom (Standing On The Right Shoulders).  Right now her class has two departments... IRS and Gardening.  Most of the kids owe taxes but so far none of them have paid any.  A couple nights ago Michelle and I discussed the idea that the point of the kids paying taxes was for them to use their pennies to paint a picture of a megareal classroom.

What would happen if Pinker applied the pragmatarian model to language?  He'd start a website where people could submit new words... or new meanings for old words.  Every member of Pinker's  website would pay $1/month but they could use their pennies to help sort the list of words/meanings.  At the top of the list would be the most valuable new words/meanings... they would receive the most attention... which means that they would be more quickly integrated into the language.  Determining people's willingness to pay (WTP) for new words/meanings would facilitate the efficient evolution of language.  Language would go from real to megareal in less time... and so would society.

Right now there are markets for products that we can spend our money on (food, clothes, etc)... and "markets" for products that we can't spend our money on (coasianism, language, etc).  If Cowen had pointed out this market dichotomy/paradox to Pinker... how would he have responded?  How would Jonathan Haidt have responded?  Would their responses have been as intelligent as they are?  If not, then how many intelligent people would Cowen have to ask before an intelligent answer was provided?

It's not that we technically can't spend our money on the word "megareal", for example, it's just that there's no pragmatarian system for us to do so.  Part of the premise of pragmatarianism is the free-rider problem...

1. We all have limited attention/time/brainpower
2. Not all ideas are equally valuable
3. Spending improves rationality
4. The free-rider problem is a real problem

With the pragmatarian model, the free-rider problem is solved.  With Pinker's website, I might as well spend my pennies on "megareal" and on other new words/meanings that I value...

Under most real-world taxing institutions, the tax price per unit at which collective goods are made available to the individual will depend, at least to some degree, on his own behavior. This element is not, however, important under the major tax institutions such as the personal income tax, the general sales tax, or the real property tax. With such structures, the individual may, by changing his private behavior, modify the tax base (and thus the tax price per unit of collective goods he utilizes), but he need not have any incentive to conceal his "true" preferences for public goods. - James M. Buchanan, The Economics of Earmarked Taxes

Would Pinker also be willing to spend $1/month on the new words/meanings that he values?  Or does he want to maintain the belief that determining WTP isn't necessary for language/culture/society to efficiently evolve?

Ideally, what we want is an arena in which the rules of the game make it so that no matter how emotionally tied you are to your belief, if it’s wrong, it’ll be shown to be wrong and it’ll just be too embarrassing to hold on to it or at least for other people to hold on to it indefinitely. That’s what I consider to be the ideal of what science is all about, and intellectual discourse in general. - Steven Pinker

Right now I'm holding onto the idea that voting should be replaced with spending (coasianism).  Am I holding onto the wrong idea?

Let’s say if people say harmful things — take a classic case. There’s a football team called the Washington Redskins. I’m pretty sure most of its fans, the intent is not offense, but there is an offense there for many people. It’s called a harm, and there are some demands that name be changed. There is a public or social dimension to the name, that if certain groups are insulted enough times maybe there’s a demoralization or other kinds of prejudice become seen as more effective.  How do you think through whether the Washington Redskins should be called the Washington Redskins, and does this not mean that on campus there should be some political correctness? - Tyler Cowen

These ideas are clearly conflicting.  How should the conflict be resolved?  By voting?

Once they start saying we’re going to put to a vote everything. Everyone gets to opine on whether we take down this, take down this. Before you know it, you’re taking down everything because presumably religious students are offended by certain things, conservative students are offended by certain things, everyone’s offended by something. - Jonathan Haidt

Not by voting?  So by a market for ideas?

You have to see college campuses as being institutions that were designed or intended to be places where people come up against diverse ideas, they’re challenged, and as within the marketplace — monopoly destroys a lot of the value of the marketplace — if you have a monopoly on ideas in the intellectual marketplace, you kill the marketplace. Campuses are supposed to be places where nobody has a monopoly on ideas, but they’ve become that in the last few years. - Jonathan Haidt

The idea of a market for ideas is really wonderful, but... it's really painful that this "market" is missing the idea of determining people's WTP for ideas.  All markets should be based on WTP!  Why?  Again...

1. We all have limited attention/time/brainpower
2. Not all ideas are equally valuable
3. Spending improves rationality
4. The free-rider problem is a real problem

What would happen if the owners of the Washington Redskins used coasianism to decide whether or not to change the name?  Then the relevant ideas would be sorted by their true social value.  As a result, society's limited attention/time/brainpower would be efficiently allocated.

Again, this is a critique from outside, but what a lot of people say which sounds right to me is that the early economists were great social theorists. My God, you read Adam Smith, what a brilliant world philosopher, historian, they thought so broadly and you tell me, but it seems there was a weird turn in the mid‑20th century towards mathematics. - Jonathan Haidt

From my perspective, the Wealth of Nations is the most valuable book ever written.  Here's what I consider to be the most valuable passage/idea in this most valuable book...

It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stocks towards the employments which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to the society. But if from this natural preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments, the fall of profit in them and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose them to alter this faulty distribution. Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society among all the different employments carried on in it as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society. - Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 

Right now the distribution of attention/time/brainpower is faulty.  In other words, our limited resources are inefficiently allocated.  This is simply because there are far too many "markets" that don't determine people's WTP.  Why are there so many "markets" that don't determine people's WTP?  Because there isn't a pragmatarian market that would allow myself, and everybody else, to sort books and their ideas by their true value.

Compare Adam Smith's passage to this passage by Andy Greenberg...

What’s more, some limited evidence suggests that this kind of quick detection can actually help to tame trolling. Conversation AI was inspired in part by an experiment undertaken by Riot Games, the video­game company that runs the world’s biggest multi­player world, known as League of Legends, with 67 million players. Starting in late 2012, Riot began using machine learning to try to analyze the results of in-game conversations that led to players being banned. It used the resulting algorithm to show players in real time when they had made sexist or abusive remarks. When players saw immediate automated warnings, 92 percent of them changed their behavior for the better, according to a report in the science journal Nature. -  Andy Greenberg, Inside Google’s Internet Justice League and its AI-Powered War on Trolls 

Google is allocating a massive amount of society's limited attention/time/brainpower in order to try and use AI to solve the problem of trolling and abusive comments.  Why are they trying to use AI instead of IH (Invisible Hand)?  Why does Google think that an AI feedback loop will improve behavior more than a IH feedback loop would?

It's one thing if Jared Cohen had said, "Yeah, we created an IH feedback loop for comments... but it didn't work.   It turned out that the most abusive comments/ideas were actually the most valuable. So now we're allocating our resources to improving the AI feedback loop."  The impression that I get is that Cohen doesn't even realize that the IH feedback loop is an option.

Those of us who truly value/understand the IH feedback loop have completely failed to bring it to the attention of Google and countless other organizations.

Caplan recently tweeted a link to one of his older blog entries...


What prompts even unsophisticated consumers to practice self-correction?  The reason is pretty obvious: In markets, self-correction saves the self-corrector money, quality, time, and/or convenience.   If you don't self-correct, you get burned.  Badly.  And often.           
The opposite holds in politics.  Few voters exhibit even rudimentary self-correction.

In my previous blog entry I shared an experiment that Galloism helped to facilitate.  At a local college, a psychology professor is allowing three of his classes to decide whether they have class outside or inside.  One of the classes is using voting while the other two are using spending (coasianism).

Last Monday, all three classes decided to have class outside.  In both of the coasianism classes, there were two individuals who successfully cheated.

All of the cheaters in the morning class got burned.  Will their class have more or less cheaters the next time?  In the afternoon class, none of the cheaters got burned.  Will their class have more or less cheaters the next time?

Trying to play chicken with your class might be fun for some, but I'm guessing that it won't end up being a very profitable long-term strategy...

It is impossible for anyone, even if he be a statesman of genius, to weigh the whole community's utility and sacrifice against each other.  - Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation

As the cheaters realize this, the two conflicting ideas (outside vs inside) will be accurately sorted by their value.

Last year Bryan Caplan posted a blog entry about the problem with seminars...

Can't speakers deflect the pointless interruptions to make the talk train run on time?  It's tough.  You can't just say, "Please, only good questions."  And once you take one silly question, every other squeaky wheel feels entitled to put in his two cents.  "Hey, my question's clearly better than the last guy's!"  As a speaker, then, you have to choose between offending a fifth of the audience or boring the entirety.  Professionally speaking, the former is the greater danger. - Bryan Caplan, How to Fix Seminars

What was Caplan's solution?  It sure wasn't this...

What prompts even unsophisticated consumers to practice self-correction?  The reason is pretty obvious: In markets, self-correction saves the self-corrector money, quality, time, and/or convenience.   If you don't self-correct, you get burned.  Badly.  And often. 

Once you have a forum based on the pragmatarian model, then the speaker can start a thread that members of the audience can reply to whenever they have an idea (question or comment).  The "crowd" can use their pennies to sort the ideas by their value.  The most valuable ideas will be at the top of the list.  The speaker can easily find them and address them at any time.  After the seminar is over, the group can continue using the thread to discuss/debate the topic and valuate/sort the ideas.

Each member of the group would efficiently/effectively tap into the group's collective intelligence/information.  The people who share the most valuable ideas will be rewarded for improving the group's collective intelligence/information.  Incentives matter...

1. We all have limited attention/time/brainpower
2. Not all ideas are equally valuable
3. Spending improves rationality
4. The free-rider problem is a real problem
5. Incentives matter

Scott Sumner also brought up the quality concern regarding comments...

I'm not going to even comment on the Ashley Madison case.  I've found that Americans are so deranged when it comes to matters of gender, race, and sex that it's almost impossible to have an intelligent conversation on those subjects.  So I generally try to avoid those topics.  (Actually Bryan is one of the few people I know with whom I could have an intelligent conversation on any topic, if no commenters were listening in.)  - Scott Sumner, Beyond victims and villains

And I tried to bring the IH solution to his attention.  My favorite liberal economist, John Quiggin, also had the same issue with comments...

Plume, I agree with other commenters here. From now on, for my post, can you limit yourself to one comment per post per day. - John Quiggin, Income redistribution: Where should we start?  
Brett, you were banned some time ago. I don’t want my discussion threads derailed by debates with you. Could other commenters refrain from responding to Brett, please. - John Quiggin, Locke’s Road to Serfdom

I also tried to bring the IH solution to his attention...

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While I'm at it... I should point out that the solution to the comment problem really isn't to limit Plume's comments.  The solution is to create a market in the comment section!  Quiggin could spend his pennies on whichever comments he values most.  Everybody else could do the same.  Then, if people wanted to, they could sort the comments by their value.  The most valuable comments would be at the top of the comment section and the least valuable comments would be at the bottom of the comment section.

If we think of Quiggin's blog entry as a home... then the comment section would be the garden.  Plume is a weed that grows everywhere in the garden.  He takes up way too much space in the garden.  The thing is... it's a really big garden... and not all the space is equally valuable.  The most valuable space is closest to the house.  So the problem really isn't that Plume is taking up too much space... the problem is that he's taking up too much valuable space.  All the valuable space that Plume takes up could be used for far more valuable plants.  Sure, Quiggin could manually limit the amount of valuable space that Plume occupies... but a far more effective approach would be for Quiggin to give more water, food and love to the plants that he values most.  They would grow more vigorously and, as a result, they would crowd out Plume and all the other weeds.  Pretty soon all the most valuable space in the garden would be occupied entirely by the most valuable plants.  The garden would still have weeds... but they would be located in the most remote part of the very big garden.

This is how and why markets work.  Consumers can't pull weeds... but they can help nourish the most beneficial plants.  The logical result of consumer choice is that resources are unevenly distributed among the unequally beneficial plants.  Redistribution might seem fair... but it simply provides more valuable space to less valuable plants.

Nobody truly benefits when society's limited resources are placed in less beneficial hands.  In other words, the opportunity cost of fairness is way too high.

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And a bit here as well....

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Some weeds are hard to get rid of!  Clearly Quiggin doesn't value Plume's and Brett's contributions as highly as he values other people's contributions.  Just like I don't value all the different plants in my garden equally.  "Weeds" are the plants that I value the least.  I'd be happy if my garden didn't have any weeds in it!  In fact, I'd love to have a magic wand that would instantly turn each and every weed in my garden into an orchid!  How awesome would that be?  I would just wave the wand over a weed and voila!  It would be instantly transformed into an orchid!  Then my garden would provide me with much more value!

Quiggin definitely wants his blog's comment section to provide him with much more value.   He also definitely opposes slavery.  But honestly I'm not quite sure why he opposes slavery.  I don't think that I've ever read a blog entry of his that he's dedicated to explaining why, exactly, he opposes slavery.  

What's wrong with slavery?  Let's take Brett for example.  Right now he's a weed in Quiggin's garden.  From Quiggin's perspective... all the space that Brett takes up in Quiggin's garden could be allocated to far more valuable plants.  In other words... the opportunity cost of Brett is too high.  What if Quiggin could wave his magic wand and transform Brett into an orchid?  Wouldn't that be a good thing?  And isn't slavery a magic wand that would do the trick?  Then Brett would do whatever Quiggin wanted him to do.

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Anyways, I think that you get my point.  Ideas should be sorted by their value.  This can only be accomplished when we determine people's WTP for ideas.  As far as I can tell, according to the basic facts...

1. We all have limited attention/time/brainpower
2. Not all ideas are equally valuable
3. Spending improves rationality
4. The free-rider problem is a real problem
5. Incentives matter

... pragmatarianism and coasianism are two excellent ways to determine people's WTP for ideas.

Monday, October 31, 2016

Clarifying The Demand For Having Class Outside

In this Nation States forum thread... 4th Grade Nation State... one of the participants, Galloism, has facilitated an experiment to test the relative long-term effectiveness of using spending (coasianism) to make group decisions.   At a local college, a psychology professor is allowing two of his classes to use coasianism to decide whether to have class inside or outside.  A third class is using voting to decide.

With coasianism, the students write down their...

1. Name
2. Preferred option (ie outside)
3. Willingness to pay (WTP)

Once all the students have turned in their valuation forms, the professor does some basic math to determine the most valuable option (MVO).  The students who prefer the MVO have to give their money to the professor.  The students who do not prefer the MVO do not have to spend any money.  Instead, they are proportionally compensated.  The winners have to pay the losers.

Today was the first day of the experiment.  All three classes decided to have class outside.  With the voting class... 16 voted in favor and 1 voted against.  It was a classic example of tyranny of the majority.

With the coasianism classes, it wasn't tyranny of the majority because the majority fairly compensated the minority.  The majority traded with the minority.

In a different but similar study (One Man, One Bid), which I discussed here, there were two key differences...

1. quadratic voting
2. equal compensation

Sunday, October 30, 2016

Coherent Economics VS Will Wilkinson

Over a year ago, Will Wilkinson wrote this blog entry... Libertarianism and the Politics of Everything.  Here's the comment that I wrote on his entry...

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Coffee tastes like politics? Yuck! No wonder I don't drink the stuff!

You spend your money on coffee... I do not spend my money on coffee. We spend our money differently because we have different preferences. Human diversity is the basis of consumer choice. Consumer choice is economics. Economics is the opposite of politics. Economics is the opportunity cost of politics.

If coffee was in the realm of politics... then one of us would have to get screwed. Either my money would be spent on coffee... despite the fact that I can't stand the stuff... or your money wouldn't be spent on coffee... despite the fact that you love the stuff. Would you really want coffee to be in the realm of politics? No? Then why in the world would you want anything to be in the realm of politics?

Politics only exists because people don't understand economics. If people understood economics then they would clearly see the absolute absurdity of allowing a small group of elected officials to spend everybody's taxes.

The next time that you drink coffee... don't think about politics. Think about how you're pretty happy with your coffee despite the fact that I'm entirely free not to spend any of my money on coffee.

To be clear... the free-rider problem is a real problem... so we need the public sector... but we really don't need it to be a political realm. Libertarianism is the belief that we need to kick most public goods out of the public sector. Pragmatarianism is the belief that we need to kick politics out of the public sector.

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This morning in my twitter feed I found this...



And this...


Let's start here...

You start to accept that spending cuts are ultimately more about optimizing the composition and effectiveness of spending than about the overall level of spending or its rate of growth. - Will Wilkinson, What If We Can't Make Government Smaller?

Definitely!  Yes!  True!  But what, exactly, does government effectiveness depend on? Does Wilkinson know the answer to this question?

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When those most likely to benefit from social spending have a political voice, they demand more of it. - Will Wilkinson, What If We Can't Make Government Smaller?

When people get richer, they seem to want more government. In particular, they want more welfare spending. It’s mainly the positive relationship between rising demand for welfare services/transfers and rising GDP per capita that drives Wagner’s Law. - Will Wilkinson, What If We Can't Make Government Smaller?

Bill Niskanen said that “the longer-term challenge for those of us who favor limited constitutional government is to try to convince voters to reduce their demand for the services financed by federal spending.” However, the fact of the matter is that our well-funded and well-organized attempts “to convince voters to reduce their demand for the services financed by federal spending” so far have all failed. - Will Wilkinson, What If We Can't Make Government Smaller?

If we look at the world, what we see is that when people get richer, they want more welfare state. Maybe there’s nothing much we can do about that. - Will Wilkinson, What If We Can't Make Government Smaller?

Folks on the right need to consider the possibility that we’ve been wrong to see demand for government as the sort of dependent variable that can be manipulated through education or propaganda or political organizing or too-clever-by-half fiscal policy gymnastics or far-fetched constitutional amendments. The only variable the level of government spending clearly and reliably responds to over the long run is GDP per capita, and the relationship goes the wrong way. When people get richer, they want more welfare state. - Will Wilkinson, What If We Can't Make Government Smaller?


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Imagine that Wilkinson is at the grocery store.  He finds an employee and says, "I want coffee".  The employee replies, "Aisle 8".   Wilkinson goes to aisle 8 and finds a wide variety of coffee to choose from.  Why is there a wide variety to choose from?  Maybe it has something to do with the fact that he's free to choose which variety he believes will provide him with the most bang for his buck.   When he chooses a variety he then has to decide the quantity.  Will he fill up his entire shopping cart with coffee?  Maybe he'd consider the opportunity cost.

When he's finished putting items in his shopping cart... he goes to find a cashier.  He tells her, "I demand coffee".  And she says, "Yeah, great, I can see that!"  She just takes his word for it and he walks out the store?  Of course not.  If he truly wants/demands coffee, then he's going to have to take out his wallet and prove it.

This is so fundamentally basic.  Wants are unlimited, resources are not.   Willingness to pay (WTP) is how we ensure that limited resources are put to their most valuable uses.  Therefore, effective/efficient government depends on WTP.  Does Wilkinson understand this?

There’s an abiding faith on the right that there must be policy levers that can be pulled to reduce political demand for government spending. - Will Wilkinson, What If We Can't Make Government Smaller?

See that?  He said "political demand".  Which implies that he grasps that there are other types of demand.  But he doesn't really feel any need to point out or mention or highlight or discuss the important difference between political "demand" and economic demand.  Yet...

But if you’ve been following the proposals of this year’s presidential contenders, or glanced at the unrelenting spending trendlines, it’s hard say attempts at economic and political education have had any effect at all. - Will Wilkinson, What If We Can't Make Government Smaller?

Wilkinson knows that if he truly wants coffee, then he's going to have to pay for it.  He's going to have to actually demonstrate that he's truly willing to sacrifice the alternative uses of his money.  But why doesn't he apply this fundamentally basic economic concept to government?

Political "demand" really isn't the same as economic demand, and economic demand is the only way that we can know what people truly want.  Knowing what people truly want is the only way that the government is going to be truly effective/efficient.  

Libertarians half believe this*.  So, as a result, their attempts at economic education have always been half-assed.  Libertarians, by definition, are economically incoherent.  They say that determining true demand is necessary for coffee... but it's not necessary for defense. Because, evidently, congresspeople are partially omnisicent.  Or, resources are unlimited in the public sector.

Well... to be clear... anarcho-capitalists are not libertarians.  Murray Rothbard, to his incredible credit, grasped that knowing the demand for defense is just as important as knowing the demand for coffee...

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One of the most absurd procedures based on a constancy assumption has been the attempt to arrive at a consumer’s preference scale . . . Through quizzing him by questionnaires.  In vacuo, a few consumers are questioned at length on which abstract bundle of hypothetical commodities they would prefer to another abstract bundle, etc. Not only does this suffer from the constancy error, no assurance can be attached to the mere questioning of people. Not only will a person’s valuations differ when talking about them than when he is actually choosing, but there is also no guarantee that he is telling the truth. - Murray Rothbard

Individual valuation is the keystone of economic theory. - Murray Rothbard

The concept of demonstrated preference is simply this: that actual choice reveals, or demonstrates, a man’s preferences; that is, that his preferences are deducible from what he has chosen in action. Thus, if a man chooses to spend an hour at a concert rather than a movie, we deduce that the former was preferred, or ranked higher on his value scale. Similarly, if a man spends five dollars on a shirt we deduce that he preferred purchasing the shirt to any other uses he could have found for the money. This concept of preference, rooted in real choices, forms the keystone of the logical structure of economic analysis, and particularly of utility and welfare analysis. - Murray Rothbard

The crucial point is that when consumers spend, they benefit, because the expenditures are voluntary. The consumers buy product X because they decide that, for whatever reason, it would benefit them to buy that product rather than use the money on some other product or save or add to their cash balances. They give up money for product X because they expect to prefer that product to whatever they could have done with the money elsewhere; their preference reflects a judgment of relative benefit from that, as compared to another, purchase. In my own terms, spending choices by consumers demonstrate their preference for one, as compared to another, way of using their money. - Murray Rothbard

Since "benefits" are subjective, we cannot measure anyone's benefit on the market either, but we can conclude, from a person's voluntary purchase, that his (expected) benefit was greater than the value to him of the money given up in exchange. If I buy a newspaper for 25 cents, we can conclude that my expected benefit is greater than a quarter. But since taxes are compulsory and not voluntary, we can conclude nothing about the alleged benefits that are paid for with them. Suppose, in analogy, that I am forced at gunpoint to contribute 25 cents for a newspaper and that that newspaper is then forcibly hurled at my door. We would be able to conclude nothing about my alleged benefit from the newspaper. Not only might I be willing to pay no more than 5 cents for the paper, or even nothing on some days, I might positively detest the newspaper and would demand payment to accept it. From the fact of coercion there is no way of telling. Except that we can conclude that many people are not getting 25 cents' worth from the paper or indeed are positively suffering from this coerced "exchange."   Otherwise, why the need to exercise coercion? Which is all that we can conclude about the "benefits" of taxation. - Murray Rothbard

We have no idea how much the taxpayers would value these services, if indeed they valued them at all. For example, suppose that the government levies a tax of X dollars on A, B, C, and so on, for police protection—for protection, that is, against irregular, competing looters and not against itself. The fact that A is forced to pay $1,000 is no indication that $1,000 in any sense gauges the value to A of police protection. It is possible that he values it very little, and would value it less if he could turn to competing defense agencies. Moreover, A may be a pacifist; so he may consider the State's police protection a net harm rather than a benefit. But one thing we do know: If these payments to government were voluntary, we can be sure that they would be substantially less than present total tax revenue. - Murray Rothbard

In the first place, how much of the deficient good should be supplied? What criterion can the State have for deciding the optimal amount and for gauging by how much the market provision of the service falls short? Even if free riders benefit from collective service X, in short, taxing them to pay for producing more will deprive them of unspecified amounts of private goods Y, Z, and so on. We know from their actions that these private consumers wish to continue to purchase private goods Y, Z, and so on, in various amounts. But where is their analogous demonstrated preference for the various collective goods? We know that a tax will deprive the free riders of various amounts of their cherished private goods, but we have no idea how much benefit they will acquire from the increased provision of the collective good; and so we have no warrant whatever for believing that the benefits will be greater than the imposed costs. The presumption should be quite the reverse. And what of those individuals who dislike the collective goods, pacifists who are morally outraged at defensive violence, environmentalists who worry over a dam destroying snail darters, and so on? In short, what of those persons who find other people’s good their “bad?” Far from being free riders receiving external benefits, they are yoked to absorbing psychic harm from the supply of these goods. Taxing them to subsidize more defense, for example, will impose a further twofold injury on these hapless persons: once by taxing them, and second by supplying more of a hated service. — Murray Rothbard


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Unfortunately, Rothbard's excellent attempt at economic education was almost entirely eclipsed by his solution (abolishing/annihilating/destroying the government).   Rothbard never realized that the demand for defense could easily be determined by allowing each and every taxpayer to decide for themselves whether additional defense was worth more than the alternative uses of their own tax dollars.

Noah Smith wants Wilkinson to write a book.  Well...




How intellectually deficient would Wilkinson's book be if it didn't address Rothbard's economic criticism of government?  Would it be more or less intellectually deficient than his article?

With all of this in mind, Wilkinson's perspective on basic income shouldn't be a surprise...






Friday, October 28, 2016

Standing On The Right Shoulders

Am I trying to stand on the right shoulders?  Are you trying to stand on the right shoulders?  These are good questions to ask because... life is too short to spend standing on the wrong shoulders.  Life is too short to spend barking up the wrong trees.

I saw this on twitter last week...




James Buchanan is my favorite recently dead economist so of course I listened to it.  And of course I enjoyed it but... it felt too broad/general... or something.  It's a bit hard for me to complain though because I suspect it was supposed to be a broad overview.  Hey Munger... fancy sharing the text of your lecture?  It was nice to listen to but it's not so easy to reference/quote.  Also, why not put it on Youtube and your blog?

Munger mentioned an interview with Geoffrey Brennan.  I did a quick google search to try and find it but failed to do so.  A day or two later I was on Youtube randomly searching for videos of Buchanan when I spotted this one...





It's funny because I listened to the entire thing without realizing that it was the interview that I was actually looking for.  I didn't know that Geoffrey Brennan is Australian!

Here's the second part...





You can download the audio files from Liberty Fund... part 1 and part 2.  While listening to the interview I roughly noted some topics of particular interest...

Part 1

10: benefit principle
18: game theory
27: econometric nonsense
28: experimental economics
29: Knut Wicksell
59: minimum vs productive state

Part 2

30: Friedrich Nietzsche, inside house looking outside through different windows
39: value of prizes
54: Mormons
56?:  no children, motivation for promoting liberty

Does anybody have a transcript of the interview?

The interview took place in 2001.  It really seemed like Buchanan was bashing econometrics more than decade before it was fashionable to do so.

Where was I in 2001?   I had been out of the Army Infantry for a couple of years and I was going to Pasadena City College.  Was I even a libertarian then?  When I transferred to UCLA to study international development I was probably a libertarian.  Between my junior and senior year... thanks to being in the active Army Reserves... I spent a year in Afghanistan.  When I returned I was definitely a libertarian.  Of course now I'm no longer a libertarian.  Now I'm a pragmatarian.

My point is that it would have been pointless for me to interview Buchanan in 2001.  Now it's 2016 and I have a gazillion questions that I'd love to ask him... but he died in 2013.  I was 35 years old?  Our lives overlapped but we never connected.

Just like I'm a huge fan of Buchanan.... he was a huge fan of Wicksell.  Buchanan was 7 years old when Wicksell died.  Even less of an overlap.

I really enjoyed the part in the interview where Buchanan talked about Wicksell.  It would be nice to have the exact quote but... in the meantime...

It is impossible for anyone, even if he be a statesman of genius, to weigh the whole community's utility and sacrifice against each other. - Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation
Justice would thereby have been done at least to the extent that each man received his money’s worth. - Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation
For Buchanan, Wicksell is “the intellectual father of modern public finance” (Buchanan, 1968: 192), and he states: “In any overall evaluation of the history of fiscal thought, Wicksell alone commands the heights of genius” (Buchanan, 1967: 285).  Buchanan’s Nobel-prize speech honored Wicksell with the accolade that Wicksell deserves designation as the most important precursor in public finance theory. (Buchanan, 1987: 243). - Bernd Hansjürgens, The Influence of Knut Wicksell on Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan
The effect (of the Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, B.H.) on me was dramatic. Wicksell laid out before me a set of ideas that seemed to correspond precisely with those that I had already in my head, ideas that I could not have expressed and would not have dared to express in the public-finance mindset of the time.  - James Buchanan, Economics from the Outside in: "Better Than Plowing" and Beyond

I think it's safe to say that Buchanan stood on Wicksell's shoulders.

Not too long after I listened to Munger's lecture on Buchanan I saw, thanks to Glen Weyl, this tweet....


I read the version on Jingjing Zhang's webpage where I found this...

In this paper we have demonstrated the inefficiency of elections, i.e. their inability to achieve socially optimal outcomes in situations without a clear ex ante winner (Proposition 1). We have also shown that a simple bidding mechanism yields higher overall welfare and better outcomes for all voters. These bidding mechanisms therefore represent practical implementations of Wicksell's idea of “unanimity and voluntary consent in taxation," i.e. the insight that if a proposal yields a common outcome with a positive net value to society then there exists a compensation scheme by which those that gain from the proposal can compensate those that lose and the proposal can be approved unanimously. - Jacob K. Goeree and Jingjing Zhang, One Man, One Bid

Also...

This endogenous choice of institution is inspired by Wicksell's (1896) principle of unanimity and voluntary consent in taxation: “if a proposal yields a common outcome that applies to all members of a collective, and the outcome provides higher overall welfare, then there exists a compensation scheme whereby those that gain from the outcome compensate those that are harmed in a manner such that everyone is better off. As a result, the proposal will be accepted unanimously." In our experiments there is no status quo so it is unclear which of the two institutions would require unanimous consent. To not favor either bidding or voting, we let the choice of institution be determined by majority voting. - Jacob K. Goeree and Jingjing Zhang, One Man, One Bid

Wicksell!  Well yeah.  The winners should compensate the losers.  For all intents and purposes, Goeree and Zhang are standing on Wicksell's shoulders.   Then again, so did Buchanan but, as far as I know, he didn't have the same idea.  Well... I'm pretty sure that Goeree and Zhang didn't cite Buchanan in their paper.

What's really interesting is that I had independently thought of the same general idea as Goeree and Zhang...

- Clarifying The Demand For Green Lights (Feb 2016)
- Popular vs Valuable (Mar 2016)
- Nude Beach Economics (Sept 2016)
- 4th Grade Nation State (Oct 2016)


However, they thought of the same general idea several years before I did...

Given we’ve been doing “one person, one vote” for so long, I think it is highly unlikely that we will ever see Glen’s idea put into practice in major political elections.  Two other economists, Jacob Goeree and Jingjing Zhang have been exploring a similar idea to Glen’s and testing it in a laboratory environment. Not only does it work well, but when given a choice between standard voting and this bid system, the participants usually choose the bid system.  

This voting scheme can work in any situation where there are multiple people trying to choose between two alternatives — e.g., a group of people trying to decide which movie or restaurant to go to, housemates trying to decide which of two TV’s to buy, etc.  In settings like those, the pool of money that is collected from people voting would be divided equally and then redistributed to the participants. - Steven D. Levitt, An Alternative to Democracy?

Even though we both thought of the same general idea... we really didn't think of the same exact idea!  Which is really fascinating!

In their version they use quadratic voting and they evenly distribute the compensation.  In my version, the outcome is simply based on the willingness to pay (WTP) of the participants.  Plus, the compensation is proportionally distributed based on WTP.  The greater a participant's WTP (cost/harm)... the greater their compensation.

In my previous blog entry, I shared three trades that have already been made in my friend's 4th grade class...

1. Deciding which book to read (29 Sept 2016)...





2. Deciding who should be in charge of their IRS (7 Oct 2016)...






3. Deciding what the class insect should be (11 Oct 2016)...






Today a fourth trade was made...

4. Deciding who should be in charge of their Gardening Department (28 Oct 2016)...




My friend Michelle didn't just replace voting with spending... she also's taxing the compensation but allowing the students to choose which class/school goods they spend their taxes on.  Hence the need for an IRS.

Today the second department (IRS was the first) was created... the Gardening Department.  Or Department of Gardening?

Michelle and I are both avid plant enthusiasts... which is how we met.  She quickly transferred her enthusiasm for plants to her students and they've transformed several of the school's empty patches of dirt into thriving green spaces.  So it's only natural that the students should have the opportunity to give their taxes to a department dedicated to gardening.

After the first trade the students brought up the issue of Michelle participating in the trades.  The class was strongly supportive of her doing so.  I texted Michelle when she was at school and told her to ask the students whether they wanted their parents to have the opportunity to participate.  They overwhelming said "no".  I then had Michelle ask the class whether I should be allowed to participate.  I sent a follow up text that if they said "no" that I would want all my pennies back.  I had given Michelle 700 pennies and she gave each of her 30 students 20 pennies for the first trade.  It's hard to know exactly when it started, but now the students are bringing pennies, nickles, dimes, quarters and even dollars from home.  However, only pennies can be used for participation.

Well, actually, most of the kids started bringing money from home when Michelle started auctioning off quotes from my collection.  Each day she sold one or more quotes and the average winning bid for the first 10 or so quotes was around 50 cents.  The winners will be able to decide which class/school goods their money gets spent on.  Michelle and I were curious whether it would be possible to create a market for ideas in her classroom.  Ideally her students would trade ideas as enthusiastically as kids (used to?) trade baseball cards.  Maybe nowadays it's Pokemon?  Gotta catch them all?

Getting back on track, the students all enthusiastically said that I could also participate in the trades.  I haven't met her students and don't plan on doing so... I don't even like kids.  Michelle refers to me as "the inventor" when they discuss trading/taxing.

Today Michelle texted me that they were about to use spending to choose who should be in charge of the Gardening Department.  The responsibilities include... giving taxpayers receipts when they make tax payments, keeping track of tax payments, deciding how to spend the revenue and keeping track of expenditures.  I'm sure that there will be other responsibilities as well.  Today her students received gmail addresses so they'll be able to use google docs, sheets and slides.  It will help them keep track of all the information.

When Michelle asked for nominees... there were way too many and there was some difficulty narrowing the candidates.  So in this case, there ended up being 6 options to choose from.  Michelle texted me the options and I told her to let me know when she had already turned in her own valuation.  When she did so, I texted her that my valuation was $1.50 for Brianna.

My valuation wasn't random... it was based on information that Michelle had previously shared about Brianna's diligence, competence and initiative.  It was also based on one of her homework assignments.

After the first trade the students were given an optional extra credit homework assignment of answering some questions about the process. The students didn't know what "extra credit" meant and asked Michelle. She told them to guess and one student guessed that it meant pennies and another student followed with the guess that more writing meant more pennies. Michelle didn't confirm or deny it. The next day Michelle said that she had never seen so many students turn in their homework. Over the weekend Michelle and I individually "graded" their homework. We didn't use the typical grading system.... we used pennies.  So we technically valuated their homework.  We both decided that completing the assignment was worth a penny. Aiden's homework was relatively decent so my valuation was 5 pennies. That's why I was willing to spend 80 pennies for him to be in charge of the IRS.   My highest valuation was 7 pennies for Brianna's homework which is partly why my valuation for her being in charge of the Gardening Department was 150 pennies.

Today, my valuation was the very last one that Michelle wrote on the board.  She called me during her lunch break and said that, when the kids saw my valuation, they all gasped/screamed... "Oh no!!!"  At first they were disappointed that their preferred candidate didn't win but then Adrian jumped up and spun around and exclaimed, "We get compensation!  We're going to get money!!"  The rest of the class cheered up at the prospect of being compensated.

In this case though their compensation was somewhat less than their valuation.  This is an issue with having so many options... the total size of the losing pie is more likely to be larger than the winning pie.  Not exactly sure what the most efficient way is to narrow down the options.

When I asked Michelle what her valuation was, I was somewhat surprised when she said that she had been willing to spend 10 cents on Jacob.  I had guessed that she would have preferred Brianna to be in charge of the Gardening Department.  My guess was obviously wrong.

I think that Michelle's compensation was 7 cents.  With a 10% tax rate... we can round up and say that she owes around a penny to the class/country government.  But she'll be able to choose which department she gives it to.  Chances are good though that she'll make a payment when she owes a few more pennies and there are a few more departments to choose from.

Would this system work better with quadratic voting and equal compensation?  I e-mailed the authors and asked about the two key differences.  Goeree quickly replied but wasn't willing, or able, to answer the question.  Instead, he wanted to point out who he believes deserves credit for the idea... Arrow, d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979... AGV).

I haven't had a chance to really dig into the relevant literature but from a quick browse the impression that I got was that they were using a replacement for democracy to try and do the job of a market.   Ack.  *Awkward*

From my perspective, coasianism (my name for replacing voting with spending) is for deciding whether prostitution, for example, should be illegal. If coasianism determines that it should be illegal... then you need a market (pragmatarianism) to allow each and every taxpayer to decide for themselves whether funding the enforcement of this law is more valuable than the alternative uses of their tax dollars.

Which brings us back to Buchanan...

Under most real-world taxing institutions, the tax price per unit at which collective goods are made available to the individual will depend, at least to some degree, on his own behavior. This element is not, however, important under the major tax institutions such as the personal income tax, the general sales tax, or the real property tax. With such structures, the individual may, by changing his private behavior, modify the tax base (and thus the tax price per unit of collective goods he utilizes), but he need not have any incentive to conceal his "true" preferences for public goods. - James M. Buchanan, The Economics of Earmarked Taxes

Geoffrey Brennan didn't ask Buchanan about this paper... and Buchanan didn't mention it.  I think part of the oversight might be explained by the section where they discussed a productive government versus a minimum government.  It seems like Buchanan had initially been more interested in, and focused on, a productive government.  But by 2001 he had become disillusioned with the system and had switched his focus to a minimum government?

It seems rather logical that this disillusionment has infected Munger, Peter Boettke and others who are the closest to standing on Buchanan's shoulders.  As far as I can tell, they've never written anything about people choosing where their taxes go.  Have they ever written anything about replacing voting with spending?   Bryan Caplan doesn't seem very interested in alternatives to voting.

Today I noticed that Boettke retweeted this...



I didn't expect to agree with David Suzuki, but a lot of what he said in the video is painfully true.  However, it's extremely important to distinguish between economics and conventional economics.  Conventional economists have almost entirely ignore the externalities associated with voting and biodiversity conservation and space colonization.  It's like biologists ignoring the existence of whales or trees or photosynthesis or evolution.  Or some better comparison.

The fact of the matter is that we can only see/reveal/show externalities when our systems eliminate people's incentives to hide their true preferences.  Therefore... scientific/economic experiments!  They are clearly possible and desirable.  By far the most important thing to test is the Invisible Hand...

It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stocks towards the employments which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to the society. But if from this natural preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments, the fall of profit in them and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose them to alter this faulty distribution. Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society among all the different employments carried on in it as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society. - Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 

I'm pretty sure that David Suzuki would argue that global warming is a faulty distribution.  But how many of his own tax dollars would he be willing to spend in order to try and correct this faulty distribution?  We don't know.  "We" don't care!  Yeah... too many economists aren't standing on the right shoulders.

It's so strange that economists don't appreciate/understand that the Invisible Hand depends on accurate information.  The Invisible Hand can't correct faulty distributions when Suzuki, for example, isn't given the freedom to use his taxes to show/communicate/reveal what he believes to be a faulty distribution.

The concept of communicating with cash is so clear and obvious to me that it feels really reasonable to conclude that conventional economics does cause brain damage.  It prevents conventional economists from seeing/understanding/appreciating the basic mechanics of how faulty distributions are corrected with incentives.

Math is a convenient culprit.  At UCLA I remember being fascinated by the Invisible Hand.  I asked at least a few professors what would happen if we applied it to the public sector.  None of them had any idea and they obviously weren't very interested in the question.  For a while there I wanted to study economics until I took an upper level economics class that consisted entirely of math.   Yeah... no.  I didn't want to study math.  I wanted to study economics.  But, according to UCLA, they were one and the same.

So maybe conventional economics doesn't make you brain damaged.  It simply selects for brain damaged individuals.  Heh.  That can't be right.  It selects for individuals who should be studying math instead of economics.  So you end up with a bunch of economists who can't appreciate the Invisible Hand because math doesn't allow them to see its true beauty.

Obviously I did end up studying economics.  But I certainly didn't study it formally/traditionally/conventionally.  Perhaps applying the Invisible Hand to one public school classroom will allow real economics to creatively destroy conventional economics.  And then it will be abundantly clear whose shoulders are the right ones to stand on... Buchanan, Hayek, Mises, Wicksell, Bastiat, Smith and a precious few others.

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Paul Samuelson: Worst Economic Theorist

Comment on: Nobel Prize 2016 Part I: Bengt Holmstrom by Kevin Bryan

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Samuelson was not the greatest economic theorist of all time.  My friend Michelle teaches a 4th grade public school class of 30 students.  She recently applied two of my economic theories to her class...

1. voting is replaced with spending
2. kids can choose where their taxes go

The first theory is largely based on Coase while the second is largely based on Smith and Buchanan.

Today the kids are using their own real money (pennies) to choose the class insect.  The kids who are compensated for their preferred insect not being chosen will have to eventually pay a tax on their compensation/income.  But they will be able to choose which class/school goods they spend their taxes on.

Can you make a solid prediction about the outcome?  Chances are extremely good that you'll be unable to.  Why?  Largely because you don't realize just how terrible an economist Samuelson was.  He was wonderful at math but terrible at economics.  Economics is all about trade.  Being terrible at economics means failing to truly understand the benefit and point of trade.  When you fail to truly understand the benefit and point of trade... then you fail to see all the places where trade isn't... but should be.

"the Soviet economy is proof that, contrary to what many skeptics had earlier believed, a socialist command economy can function and even thrive."  - Samuelson

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Here are some trades that have occurred in Michelle's class...

1. Deciding which book to read (29 Sept 2016)...





2. Deciding who should be in charge of their IRS (7 Oct 2016)...






3. Deciding what the class insect should be (11 Oct 2016)...






The most valuable option was chosen.  The students who did not get their preferred option did not have to spend their money.  Instead, they received all the money spent on the most valuable option.  The amount of money a student received was in proportion to their WTP.  

Did all these trades occur because of Samuelson?  Nope.  They occurred despite him.  He was an obstacle to trade.  He was a barrier to trade.  Samuelson was an anti-economist.  The true purpose of economics is to facilitate trade.

We must always remember that Samuelson was the great anti-Misesian of 20th century economics, and in my book that translates into a force for anti-economics despite all the scientific accolades, awards, honorary degrees, and reverence by his peers he was granted in his lifetime. - Peter Boettke, Paul Samuelson

Blocking trade is the same as blocking the flow of information...

We know what this huge volume of trading is about. It’s about information, not preference shocks. Information seems to need trades to percolate into prices. We just don’t understand why. - John H. Cochrane, Volume and Information

We don't understand why?  Really?  Maybe he should find a class of 4th graders.

The main point about which there can be little doubt is that Smith’s chief concern was not so much with what man might occasionally achieve when he was at his best but that he should have as little opportunity as possible to do harm when he was at his worst. It would scarcely be too much to claim that the main merit of the individualism which he and his contemporaries advocated is that it is a system under which bad men can do least harm. It is a social system which does not depend for its functioning on our finding good men for running it, or on all men becoming better than they now are, but which makes use of men in all their given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, sometimes intelligent and more often stupid. - Friedrich Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order

Tuesday, October 4, 2016

Samuel Hammond VS QIRE

Comment on: Voting as a collective action problem by Samuel Hammond

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Prohibition, the Holocaust and every war ever started were "solutions" to collective action "problems".  Same thing with the pyramids and putting a man on the moon.

Voting is only good to the extent that it doesn't violate Quiggin's Implied Rule of Economics (QIRE).  So... when does voting not violate QIRE?  The only way that we could know that voting was not violating QIRE would be if we actually knew people's willingness to pay (WTP) for their preferred option.  But that would require replacing voting with spending.

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Economics teaches two basic truths: people make wise choices when they are forced to weigh benefits against costs; and competition produces good results. - Edward Glaeser, If You Build It…

The correct fix for crowded roads is to charge people for the social costs of their choices. - Edward Glaeser, If You Build It… 

People should pay for the social cost of their flying. The TSA should be paid for by fliers. - Edward Glaeser, The one thing Trump and Clinton agree on is infrastructure.

Until people are made to bear the full costs of their decisions, those decisions are unlikely to be socially sound, in this as in other areas of public policy. - Richard Bird, Charging for Public Services: A New Look at an Old Idea

The people feeling, during the continuance of the war, the complete burden of it, would soon grow weary of it, and government, in order to humour them, would not be under the necessity of carrying it on longer than it was necessary to do so. The foresight of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people from wantonly calling for it when there was no real or solid interest to fight for. - Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations

Public officials and professionals may have higher preferences for some public goods than the citizens they serve. Thus they may allocate more tax monies to these services than the citizens being served would allocate if they had an effective voice in the process. Under-financing can occur where many of the beneficiaries of a public good are not included in the collective consumption units financing the good. Thus they do not help to finance the provision of that good even though they would be willing to help pay their fair share. - Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, Public Goods and Public Choices

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WTP is an incredibly coherent thread in economics (and in the best libertarianism).  Why are you ignoring it?  Do you think it's irrelevant?  Are you not aware of it?

Elsewhere you wrote...

Economists call this Tiebout sorting, a model that inspired a generation of libertarians to a kind of municipal fetishism which vastly overestimated the average person’s willingness to move, and vastly underestimated the potential for localized forms of tyranny.

It seems like you care about a person's willingness to move.  But willingness to move is the same thing as WTP.   So.... clearly, to some extent, you're not entirely unaware of WTP.  The question is... why are you ignoring it when it comes to voting?  Why does it matter when it comes to foot voting but it doesn't matter when it comes to ballot voting?

Giving people the freedom to decide for themselves whether it's truly worth it to throw the alternative uses of their own resources under the bus is the only way to prevent QIRE from being violated.